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Abstract—Applications using gesture-based human-computer
interface require a new user login method with gestures because
it does not have traditional input method to type a password.
However, due to various challenges, existing gesture based au-
thentication systems are generally considered too weak to be
useful in practice. In this paper, we propose a unified user
login framework using 3D in-air-handwriting, called FMCode.
We define new types of features critical to distinguish legitimate
users from attackers and utilize Support Vector Machine (SVM)
for user authentication. The features and data-driven models are
specially designed to accommodate minor behavior variations
that existing gesture authentication methods neglect. In addition,
we use deep neural network approaches to efficiently identify
the user based on his or her in-air-handwriting, which avoids
expansive account database search methods employed by existing
work. On a dataset collected by us with over 100 users, our
prototype system achieves 0.1% and 0.5% best Equal Error
Rate (EER) for user authentication, as well as 96.7% and 94.3%
accuracy for user identification, using two types of gesture input
devices. Compared to existing behavioral biometric systems using
gesture and in-air-handwriting, our framework achieves the state-
of-the-art performance. In addition, our experimental results
show that FMCode is capable to defend against client side
spoofing attacks, and it performs persistently in the long run.
These results and discoveries pave the way to practical usage of
gesture based user login over the gesture interface.
I. INTRODUCTION
Gesture interfaces are generally considered as the next
generation of Human-Computer Interface (HCI) which can
fundamentally change the way we interact with computer.
Moreover, platforms equipped with gesture interfaces such
as home entertainment consoles (e.g., Microsoft XBox with
Kinect [1]), Virtual Reality (VR) headsets (e.g., HTC Vive [2]),
and wearable computers (e.g., Google Soli [3]) are becoming
popular in various application scenarios. On these platforms,
user authentication and identification are basic functions for
accessing resources, personalized services, and private data.
For example, a user may be asked to verify the identity to
unlock a wearable device similar as unlock a smartphone, or
sign in a virtual site over a VR headset. However, in such an
environment, it is usually inconvenient or impractical to access
a keyboard or virtual keyboard on a touchscreen. Moreover,
in certain scenarios such as clean room or operating theater,
gesture interface is used to avoid physical touch due to high
cleanliness. Therefore, research needs to answer how to login
securely and conveniently with the gesture interface instead
of using a keyboard or touchscreen. Current VR headsets
(e.g., Oculus Rift and Vive) and wearable devices rely on
the connected desktop computer or smartphone to complete
the login procedure using either passwords or biometrics,
which is inconvenient. A few standalone VR headsets (e.g.,
Microsoft Hololens [4]) present a virtual keyboard in the air
and ask the user to type a password. However, it is slow
and user unfriendly due to the lack of key stroke feedback
and a limited recognition accuracy of the key type action
in-the-air. Moreover, passwords have their own drawbacks
due to the trade-off between the memory difficulty and the
password strength requirement. Biometrics employ the infor-
mation strongly linked to the person, which cannot be revoked
upon leakage and may raise privacy concerns in online login.
Therefore, the usage of feature-rich behavioral biometrics such
as the in-air-handwriting is preferable.
During the past decades, identity verification methods in-
volving writing the password in the air have been studied on
different input interfaces such as hand-held devices [5], [6],
[7], cameras [8], [9], [10], [11], and touchscreens [12], [13],
[14]. However, the application of such a method encounters a
few fundamental challenges. First, gesture input sensors have
limited capabilities in capturing hand movements (e.g., limi-
tation in accuracy, resolution, sampling speed, field of view,
etc.). Meanwhile the user’s writing behavior has uncertainty
in posture and magnitude. These facts make signal processing
and feature extraction difficult. Second, the captured hand-
writing contains minor variations in speed and shape even for
the same user writing the same content. Unlike the password
that does not tolerate a single bit difference, this ambiguity in
the in-air-handwriting leads to difficulty in designing match-
ing algorithms and limited discriminating capability. Hence,
existing solutions rarely achieve an acceptable authentication
performance. Third, user identification requires indexing a
large amount of accounts using the ambiguous, inaccurate and
noisy in-air-handwriting motion signals in order to efficiently
locate the desired account upon a login request, which cannot
be accomplished directly by current template matching based
methods. As a result, existing solutions have to search the
account database exhaustively to compare the signal in the
login request with the template, which is impractical for real
world usage. Fourth, for data-driven methods that train a model
to recognize each account and classify the handwriting, the
available signal samples at registration are scarce because of
usability consideration. Since we can only ask the user to write
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the passcode a few times to sign up), the effectiveness of model
training is significantly restricted.
To address these problems, we propose FMCode (i.e.,
Finger Motion Passcode), a unified user login framework by
writing an ID and a passcode in the air with the index finger,
shown in Fig. 1. The finger motion is captured by either a
wearable inertial sensor or a 3D depth camera and sent to the
server as a login request. The user can write very fast, write
in a language unable to be directly typed with a keyboard,
or just doodle, as long as the finger motion can be easily
reproduced in a stable way. Based on our datasets, usually the
content of the ID or the passcode is a meaningful string or
a shape that is easy to remember, while the writing can be
just scribbles unreadable for anyone except the creator. This
enables a much larger space for the ID and the passcode than
the traditional password consisting of only typed characters.
Additionally, because of the difference in writing convention
of different people, memorable passcodes are not susceptible
to attack as traditional password. For example, the user can
draw a five-point star as an ID or a passcode which cannot be
typed over the keyboard. Meanwhile, it has been proved that
graphical memory is easier to remember and stays longer than
passwords typed over the keyboard [15]. Due to this unique
feature, we call the in-air-handwriting as a “passcode” instead
of a “password”. Different from handwriting recognition, our
framework does not try to understand each character, but
identifies and authenticates users based on multiple factors
including both the difference of passcode content and the
fineness of handwriting convention. Hence, FMCode has both
advantages of password such as revocability and advantages
of biometrics such as non-repudiation.
The contributions of this paper are listed as follows.
1) We present a unified login framework for gesture in-
terface using the finger motion in-the-air, which can
perform both user authentication and identification effi-
ciently. Our framework supports gesture interface using
either a wearable sensor or a contactless 3D camera.
2) We design a type of feature named temporal local
difference and train an ensemblement of Support Vector
Machine (SVM) classifiers for each account to improve
the discriminant capability. Our method can tolerate
minor writing behavior variation and perform reasonably
well in the long term.
3) We design a deep Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
to index finger motion signals, which enables user iden-
tification with a constant time cost. Moreover, we invent
special data augmentation methods to train this network
with limited amount of data acquired at registration.
4) We achieve state-of-the-art performance on datasets col-
lected by us with two types of gesture input device - a
custom data glove and a Leap Motion controller. The
dataset contains more than 100 subjects from general
public and over 20,000 data points, which is larger than
most related work.
5) We study the performance under active spoofing attacks
and the long term stability with a duration of four
weeks. These scenarios are usually neglected by existing
works. Our results show that the FMCode framework has
the capability to defend client side spoofing attack and
perform persistently in the long term. This reveals great
potential of this finger motion based user login method
for practical usage.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we describe the overall system architecture and in Section
III we model the signal of the in-air-handwriting motion. Sec-
tion IV and V explains details of the proposed authentication
and identification methods. In section VI we report empirical
evaluation results with our datasets, and in section VII, we
present user evaluation results. Further discussions are given
in section VIII, and the related work is provided in Section
IX. Finally, we draw conclusions in section X. More detailed
comparison with existing work and alternative technologies
are shown in the Appendices.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. FMCode Architecture
Similar to password based login systems, FMCode requires
an initial registration comparable to the password “sign up”
step. At the registration step, the user is required to create an
account with a unique ID and a passcode, and write the ID
as well as the passcode a few times in the air. After that, the
user can sign in to the created account by writing the same
ID and passcode in the air.
There are two functional modules in the framework: (a)
a gesture user interface device that is equipped with motion
capture sensors, and (b) a login server that stores the account
database, as shown in Fig. 2. On the user side, the finger
motion of a piece of the in-air-handwriting of the ID and
the passcode is obtained, and two corresponding signals con-
taining the physical states of the hand are generated. Then,
the gesture UI device preprocesses the signals and sends
them to the login server. On the server side, each account
in the database contains a (account number, id template,
passcode template) tuple. The account number is a number
or a string of characters usually allocated by the server to
uniquely index each account. The two templates are generated
by the in-air-handwriting signals of the ID and the passcode at
registration in order to match with signals in the login request.
Once the registration is complete, the login server has the
following two main functions that can be used independently
or together.
1) User Authentication: given the account number, verify
the user identity, and “accept” or “reject” the login request
using a piece of in-air-handwriting of the passcode in the
request. The account number may be typed, remembered,
recognized by face or other means, or obtained using the
identification function detailed below. In this function, the
server executes the following three steps: (a) retrieves the
passcode template of the user’s account according to the
account number from the account database (step 3 in Fig.
2), (b) compares the template with the signal in the login
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Fig. 1. User login through gesture interface with hand motion capturing devices of wearable inertial sensor or 3D depth camera under two different scenarios:
(left) VR applications with user mobility, (right) operating theater with touchless interface for doctors to maintain high clearliness once the hands are sterilized.
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Fig. 2. System Architecture and Procedures.
request to extract features (step 4 in Fig. 2), (c) determines
whether this login request is accepted or rejected using a
binary classifier trained at registration (step 5 in Fig. 2).
2) User Identification: figure out the account number based
on a piece of in-air-handwriting of the ID. As mentioned in
the previous function, an account number is required, which
is a number or a character string inconvenient to enter through
the gesture user interface. Thus, we can ask the user to write
the ID in the air. In this function, the server first obtains one
or multiple candidate account numbers using a deep CNN
(step 2 in Fig. 2). Then for each of them, the server runs
the same three steps as the authentication to verify each of
them by comparing the id template and the signal of the in-
air-handwriting of the ID. Finally, the best matched account
number is returned. If all candidate IDs fail the verification,
“unidentified” is returned.
Note that identifying the account number does not neces-
sarily mean authenticating the user at the same time because
an ID is usually not a secret unlike a passcode. The object
of authentication is low error and high security level, while
the objective of identification is fast speed with an acceptable
accuracy. The login procedure is essentially performing both
identification and authentication. Moreover, the user can ex-
plicitly update or revoke his or her FMCode just like updating
or resetting a password at anytime. In addition, the server
can generate fuzzy hash from the in-air-handwriting of the
passcode using a similar deep CNN [16]. This fuzzy hash
can be used to further generate cryptographical keys to enable
more sophisticated authentication protocols or encrypt the
template used in the login procedure in order to minimize
the risk of server storage leakage (discussed in section VIII).
B. System Requirements and Application Scenarios
FMCode is compatible with existing IT infrastructures us-
ing password based authentication. On the server side, only
software changes are required, including the construction of
templates, the implementation of feature extraction algorithms,
the classifier and the deep CNN. The requirement of the
network between the client and the server is the same as most
password-based authentication systems, through the web. On
the client side, a motion capture device such as a wearable
device or a 3D depth camera is required. However, it should be
noted that our login framework leverages the built-in gesture
interface of the client machine rather than requires a dedicated
3
device for the login purpose. As long as the finger motion
can be captured for ordinary gesture based interaction with
the computer, our framework can be deployed. Besides, login
through our framework requires the active involvement of a
conscious and willing user, rather than presenting a piece of
static information such as password or fingerprint. This makes
FMCode potentially more secure.
Our target application scenarios include VR headsets and
wearable computers that already have a gesture interface but
lack keyboard or touchscreen, as well as scenarios that provide
gesture interface but inconvenient for typing such as operating
theater or clean room. Our framework can be used for two
different purposes. The first one is online user authentication
or identification, where the server is remotely connected to
the client via the Internet. For example, the user can sign into
an online personal account through the gesture interface on
a VR headset. The second one is local user authentication
or identification, where the client and server reside on the
same machine. For example, the user can unlock his or her
wearable devices through the gesture interface. In addition, our
framework can also be used as a supplementary authentication
factor in a Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) system together
with traditional password or biometrics.
C. Attack Model
FMCode has the same security assumptions as existing
gesture-based authentication and identification systems as
follows: (1) the device on the user side is secure(i.e., no
sniffing backdoor); (2) the authentication server is secure (i.e.,
it will not leak the stored template to malicious attackers);
and (3) the communication channel between the user and
the server is secure (i.e, no man-in-the-middle attack). These
security assumptions are also similar to traditional biometrics
and password-based system. Attacks with relaxed security
assumptions on (2) and (3) are further discussed in section
VIII. Based on the assumptions, we are mainly interested in
attacks on the user side, as listed below:
1) Random guess, i.e., the attacker tries to enter a user’s
account by guessing a passcode and signs it on the same
gesture interface, without any knowledge of the content of
the passcode;
2) Spoofing attack, i.e., the attacker knows the content and
broad strokes of the passcode of an account and tries to write
it in the air through the same gesture interface. This is similar
to the case that the attacker sign into the victim’s account with
the password leaked.
For the spoofing attack, we assume that the attack source
is a human attacker, and the attacker’s goal is to sign into
the victim’s account or be identified as the victim. If the
attack is successful, the account owner may suffer from loss
of the account or leakage of private information. Though it is
generally considered that ID is not a secret, in extreme cases, if
the attacker is wrongly identified as the victim, he or she may
launch further attacks e.g., phishing other sensitive personal
information of the victim.
Fig. 3. The In-Air-Handwriting Signal Model.
Fig. 4. Example of 3-dimensional finger motion signal (upper) when writing
“FMCODE” and the correspondence of signal segments to letters (lower).
III. IN-AIR-HANDWRITING CHARACTERIZATION
A. Finger Motion Signal Model
Handwriting is closely related to the cognitive process of
humans [17] in different levels, and hence, we model the in-
air-handwriting as a stochastic process in four levels: passcode
level, character level, stroke level, and signal level (shown
in Fig. 3). Usually each passcode is a string of meaningful
symbols or characters in some language. The passcode is
made of strokes defined by calligraphy, and the strokes further
determine the hand motion of the writing through the muscle
memory. The hand motion is captured as a series of samples
of physical states of the hand and fingers. Here the passcode,
characters, and strokes can be regarded as hidden states in
a stochastic process, and only the signal samples are the
observations. In general the in-air-handwriting process does
not satisfy the Markov property (i.e., signal samples are
correlated), and the mapping between signal samples and
strokes are not fixed due to the minor variations of the writing
speed and amplitude. However, the inherent process in the
brain of generating hand motion by writing is acquired and
reinforced when a person learns how to write [18], which
indicates that the writing behavior is bound to individuals and
persistent in the long term, as handwriting signature has been
widely used for identity verification for a long time.
We use a vector series s = (s1, s2, ..., sl) to denote the fin-
ger motion signal with l samples, where si = (si1, si2, ..., sid)
represents an individual sample obtained by the sensor with d
axes. For example, if the signal is obtained from a wearable
device with an inertial sensor, each sample si may have three
axes representing the acceleration of the fingertip of the right
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Fig. 5. Example of 10 aligned finger motion signals (upper), 2 unaligned
signals (middle), and the generated template (lower, where T is shown as the
blue line, C is shown as the red line, and C is enlarged by two to show
significance). Only the first sensor axis is shown. Best viewed with color.
hand along the x, y and z-axes, and the whole signal s may
have 250 samples at 50 Hz. Assume the signal s is aligned in
a fashion that the writing speed variation is removed, it can
be decomposed as
si = ti + ei, ei ∼ N(0,Σi),
where ti is a constant vector determined by the content of
the in-air-handwriting, and ei is a vector of Gaussian random
variables caused by the sensor noise and unintentional small
hand movements. Since ei is from different orthogonal sensor
axes, we assume these axes are independent, i.e., Σi = σiI ,
where σi = (σi1, σi2, ..., σid). An approximation of ti and σi
can be obtained by the signals {s1, s2, ..., sK} at registration,
tˆi =
1
K
K∑
k=1
ski , σˆi =
1
K − 1
K∑
k=1
(ski − tˆi).
Here tˆi is the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) of
ti and σˆi is the unbiased MLE of σi. For each account,
tˆ is stored as the id template or the passcode template,
depending on whether sk is obtained by writing the ID or
the passcode. σˆ is also stored together with the template to
indicate the template uncertainty. The aligned signal set {sk}
can be obtained by aligning each raw signal at registration
to the first signal. An example is shown in Fig. 5. In our
framework, alignment is made by the Dynamic Time Warping
(DTW) algorithm.
B. In-Air-Handwriting Signal Preprocessing
As mentioned previously, there are also user behavior un-
certainty in the writing posture and magnitude. To minimize
the influence of such uncertainty, the following preprocessing
steps are applied on the client side.
Step 1) State estimation: derive the indirect dynamic states
from the raw sensor output and fix any missing signal samples
due to the limited capability of the motion capture device.
For the wearable device with inertial sensors, we derive the
absolute orientation of the index finger relative to the starting
position [19]. For the 3D camera device, we derive the velocity
and acceleration for each sample from the position difference.
The position trajectory and posture are estimated from the
depth image frames by the 3D camera device itself.
Step 2) Trimming: throw away the sample at the start and
the end of the signal where the hand does not move intensively.
In practice, the signal can be trimmed in a more progressive
way because we observed that the user behavior has larger
uncertainty at the beginning and the end.
Step 3) Low-Pass filtering and resample: remove the high-
frequency components above 10 Hz because it is commonly
believed that a person cannot generate finger movements faster
than 10 Hz. Then the signal is resampled at 50 Hz to remove
influence on the variation of sampling rate.
Step 4) Posture normalization: translate the coordinate
system to make the average pointing direction of the hand as
the x-axis in order to remove the influence of posture variation
respect to the motion capture device. For the data glove with
inertial sensors, we also remove the influence of the gravity
on the acceleration axes.
Step 5) Amplitude Normalization: normalize the data of
each sensor axis individually, i.e., sij ← (sij − µj)/σj where
µj = mean(s1j , ..., slj), σj = std(s1j , ..., slj).
IV. USER AUTHENTICATION
The task of authentication is essentially a binary classifica-
tion problem. Our design goal is to build a data-driven model
that can optimally distinguish the signals from legitimate users
and attackers. Given an account A and an authentication
request with signal s obtained from the in-air-handwriting of
the passcode (referred as the passcode signal), we define the
following classes.
1) If s is generated by the owner of account A writing the
correct passcode, s is from the “true-user” class;
2) if s is generated by any user writing an incorrect
passcode, s is from the “guessing” class (which means
the writer does not know the passcode content);
3) if s is generated by an imposter writing the correct
passcode of account A, we define that s is from the
“spoofing” class (which means the attacker knows the
passcode content).
The “guessing” and “spoofing” classes are collectively
called the “not-true-user” class. Our authentication method
is based on the signal model explained previously – signals
generated by the same user writing the same passcode have
similar shape if they are aligned because they contain the
same sequence of strokes. Hence, we define a temporal local
distance feature that measures the difference of the signals
locally in stroke level. Moreover, we also design a method to
generate multiple feature vectors from just one pair of signal
and template to overcome the shortage of training data at
registration. Furthermore, we use an ensemblement of SVM
classifiers for each account to distinguish signals from the
“true-user” class and “not-true-user” class to maintain a stable
long term performance.
A. Feature Extraction
Given an account A, consider s is the passcode signal in
an authentication request, and tˆ is the passcode template of
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account A constructed at registration with uncertainty σˆ. The
temporal local distance features are extracted as follows.
Step 1) Align s to tˆ using DTW, so that the aligned s will
have the same length l as tˆ.
Step 2) Calculate the distance di = abs(si − tˆi), where
abs() is the element-wise absolute function.
Step 3) Segment d into H local windows, and each window
has length W = l/H , i.e., regroup d as (D1,D2, ...,DH),
where Dj = (dj×W+1,dj×W+2, ...,dj×W+W ).
Step 4) Randomly pick T different local windows as
a window set {j1, j2, ..., jT }, then randomly select a local
distance feature from each window to form a feature vector
x = (xj1,xj2, ...,xjT ), where each element xj is chosen
from Dj . Here x is defined as the temporal local distance
feature. For example, assume d has 10 samples, segmented to
five windows, and we can randomly pick two windows (i.e.,
l = 10, H = 5,W = 2, T = 2). Consider we pick the third
window (d5 to d6) and the fifth window (d9 to d10), then we
can form a feature vector by randomly choosing one sample
from each window, such as (d6,d9).
Step 5) Given a certain window set, step 4 can be repeated
multiple times to generate multiple feature vector from one
pair of signal and template. Especially, we can regard di
as a Gaussian random variable and draw samples from the
distribution di ∼ N(abs(si− tˆi), σˆi) in step 4. This technique
allows us to augment the training data from the limited signals
with “true-user” label at registration.
B. Binary Classification for Authentication
The SVM classifier is a binary classifier with linear de-
cision boundary in the feature space that can be trained
efficiently even with limited amount of data and high di-
mension of features. These characteristics are suitable for the
authentication task. Given a training dataset with data points
{(x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xn, yn)}, where {xi} are the feature
vectors and {yi} are binary class labels from {−1,+1}, SVM
seeks a hyperplane f(x) = wx + b = 0 to maximize the
separation of the data points of the two classes. Training SVM
is equivalent to solving a quadratic programming problem,
which can be done efficiently. However, since the decision
boundary is very simple, naively applying SVM on d obtained
from limited signals at registration would still suffer from the
curse of dimensionality problem and lead to poor long term
stability. Hence, we train an ensemble of SVM as follows.
Consider we are registering the account A and the template
tˆ is constructed from signals {s1, s2, ..., sK}. At registration,
the server builds M SVM classifiers for account A, with a
distinct set of T windows {j1, j2, ..., jT } randomly picked
for each classifier. To train a single classifier, first the server
extracts feature vectors from those K registration signals of
account A, and assigns them the label y = +1 (i.e., “true-
user” class). Then the server extracts feature vectors from
those registration signals of other accounts except the account
A, and assigns them the label y = −1 (i.e., “guessing”
class). Usually there are more training data of the “guessing”
class than necessary. Thus, only a portion is needed (usually
around one thousand). After the feature vectors and lables of
both classes are ready, an SVM is trained using Sequential
Minimal Optimization (SMO). Finally, once all M classifiers
are trained, the server stores the model parameters w, b, and
the set of windows {j1, j2, ..., jT } of each classifier in the
account database together with the template tˆ.
When signing into account A, given a signal s in the
authentication request, the server extracts feature vectors for
each SVM classifier using the stored information, and predicts
a score f(x) = wx+ b. Since multiple feature vectors can be
extracted with one set of windows, the server can obtain multi-
ple scores from a single s and average them. Once the scores of
all classifiers are ready, they are further averaged to produce
a single distance score, i.e., score(s) = average({f(x)}).
Finally, this score is compared with a pre-set decision thresh-
old. If score(s) < threshold, the authentication request with
signal s is accepted, otherwise, it is rejected.
The aim of the feature extraction method and classifier
ensemblement is to achieve a better separation of signals
from different classes in the feature space and maintain a
stable performance in the long term. If a signal is from the
“true-user” class, it should have a small score because similar
shape between the signal and the template leads to smaller
d. While signals from the “not-true-user” classes should have
a larger score caused by large values of elements of d due
to shape differences, whose origin is the different content or
different writing convention. However, the distance in sample
level has uncertainties because of the minor variation of
writing behavior for the same user writing the same content.
Misclassification caused by such uncertainties may happen
quite often if we blindly sum the sample level distance, as the
plain DTW algorithm. Instead, we group local samples into
segments which roughly map to the strokes, and hence, our
method can tolerate the signal level uncertainties by comparing
subset of strokes instead of samples. The final score of the
ensemblement of classifiers is essentially a weighted sum
of the sample-wise distance d, where the trained weights
help select those segments with less uncertainty and more
consistency. In our framework, H , T and M are a system-wide
parameter. H is usually chosen from 20 to 80 to approximate
the number of strokes of a in-air-handwriting passcode. T is
usually empirically chosen based on the passcode length to
avoid the curse of dimensionality. M is determined as a trade-
off between the computation time and authentication accuracy.
In an extreme case, we can make T = H and M = 1,
which means only a single SVM is used to draw a decision
boundary in a very high dimensional feature space (potentially
this dimension can reach several hundred or even exceed one
thousand). This may cause classifier stability issues in the long
term because some local features may be wrongly considered
to be consistent due to the limited amount of training data.
V. USER IDENTIFICATION
Different from authentication, the task of identification is
essentially a multi-class classification problem, which must be
done efficiently without query the account database linearly.
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Fig. 6. Convolutional neural network for user identification.
Deep CNN is a type of neural network consisting of cascaded
convolutional layers and pooling layers. The most attractive
capability of deep CNN is that it can learn and detect features
from low-level to high-level automatically by optimizing a loss
function iteratively. This characteristic is crucial to solve very
complicated pattern recognition problems, most notably the
image classification [20], [21], [22]. As illustrated previously
in the signal model, a piece of in-air-handwriting contains
hierarchical features in different abstract level, and hence, a
deep CNN is suitable to our objective of mapping a signal s
of the in-air-handwriting of the ID (referred as the ID signal)
to its corresponding account number. However, deep CNN
has not been used in in-air-handwriting signal based user
identification since the features expected to be learned in 3D
handwriting signal are fundamentally different from 2D image,
which requires the following special treatment.
The deep CNN in our framework contains five
convolutional-pooling layers, one fully-connected layer,
and one softmax layer, as shown in Fig. 6. The raw signal
is first preprocessed and stretched to a fixed length of 256
elements through linear interpolation, in order to be fed into
the CNN. For example, if the number of sensor axes is 9, the
input is a 256 by 9 matrix, where each sensor axis is regarded
as an individual channel. For each convolutional-pooling
layer, we apply a convolutional kernel of size 3 on all the
channels of the previous layer, and a 2-by-1 maxpooling on
the output of the convolutional layer for each channel. The
first two convolutional layers utilize depthwise convolution
[22] which detects local features individually on each channel
since these channels contain different physical states in
orthogonal axes. The later three convolutional layers utilize
separable convolution [22] which associates low level features
on all channels to construct high level features. For example,
each neuron in the third conv-pool layer has a receptive
field of 16 samples in the original signal, which is roughly
corresponds to one stroke. There are 96 filters in this layer
which can map to 96 different types of features in the stroke
level. These features can capture different types of basic
finger movement when writing a single stroke, including
straight motion in different directions, and sharp turning
between adjacent strokes. Hence, the output of this layer is
a 32 by 96 matrix indicating the presence and intensity of
a certain type of stroke (among all 96 types) at a certain
place of the signal (among 32 slightly overlapping segments).
Similarly, the fourth and fifth conv-pool layers are designed to
detect the presence of certain characters and phrases. Finally,
a fully connected layer runs classification on the flattened
high level features and generates the embedding vectors, and
the softmax layer maps the embedding vectors to probability
distribution of class labels (i.e., the account numbers).
A major challenge of training the CNN is the limited amount
of data at registration, which leads to overfitting easily. To
overcome this hurdle, we augment our training dataset with the
following three steps. First, given K signals {s1, s2, ..., sK}
obtained at registration, for each sk in this set, the server align
all the other signals to sk to create K−1 new signals. Second
the server randomly picks two aligned signals and exchanges
a random segment. This can be done many times to further
create many new signals. Third, for each newly created signal,
we randomly perturb a segment both in time and amplitude.
Besides of the data augmentation, we apply dropout [23] on
the fully-connected layer.
To predict the account number of an input signal, the server
simply chooses the most probable class or top-k most probable
classes in the output probability distribution. However, blindly
believing the predicted account number of the CNN may
render the server extremely vulnerable to spoofing attacks
because the decision is based on the presence of certain strokes
detected by the feature layers, and a spoofed signal generating
by writing the same content as the genuine signal naturally
has the majority of the strokes. As a result, in our framework
the server performs an additional step to verify the identity,
using the same procedure as the authentication. Instead of
passcode signal, here the server compares the ID signal and
the id template of the account corresponding to each candidate
account number. Finally, the server returns the best matched
account number or “unidentified” if the scores of all account
are above the threshold.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Data Acquisition
To evaluate our framework, we build a prototype system
with two types of gesture input device. The first device is a
custom made data glove with an inertial measurement unit
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Fig. 7. Distribution of passcode lengths of the signals in dataset 1.
(IMU) on the tip of the index finger (referred as the glove
device). Such an IMU has been widely used in the hand-
held remote controller of current VR game console and smart
TV, and it is relatively inexpensive (<$10). The glove also
has a battery-powered microcontroller on the wrist, which
collects the IMU data at 50Hz, and runs the state estimation
preprocessing step. The output signal of this device contains
a series of three Euler angles in ±180◦, tri-axis acceleration
in ±4g, and tri-axis angular speed in ±2000dps. The second
device is the Leap Motion controller (referred as the camera
device), which is an inexpensive (∼$80) commercial-off-the-
shelf 3D camera. It contains a stereo infrared camera that can
capture depth image at 55Hz ∼ 110Hz with an average 135◦
Field of View (FOV) and a range of 60cm. The Leap Motion
controller has its own processor that can estimate the hand
skeleton of each frame and obtain the 3D coordinate of each
joint of the hand. The client machine runs the state estimation
and other preprocessing steps, and outputs signal of a series
of 3D position, velocity, and acceleration.
Although our prototype system uses these two specific
devices for proof of concept and evaluation, the proposed
framework does not necessarily depend on these two devices.
It should work with any similar device that can return samples
of physical states of the fingers and the hand with a reasonable
range, resolution and sampling rate. For example, there are
other gloves [24] and rings [25] with inertial based motion
tracking, and there are open source software [26] available
that can estimate hand skeleton from 2D image or 3D depth
image. We assume these devices are part of the gesture
user interface for ordinary human-computer interaction, not
specialized device dedicated for the login purpose.
We built our own datasets as follows:
1) We invited 105 and 109 users to participate in the
data collection with the glove device and the camera device
respectively. 56 users used both devices. Each user created two
distinct strings. For each string, the user wrote it in the air for
5 times as registration, and after a rest, they wrote it 5 times
again as login. The distribution of lengths of all strings are
shown in Fig. 7 (users write a little slower with the camera
device due to its limited FOV and range).
2) For each of the string in the first dataset, 7 impostors
spoofed it for 5 times (due to the size of the first dataset there
are more than 7 impostors in total). Here “spoof” means that
the impostors know the content of the string, and try to write
it using the same motion capture device as that used by the
spoofing target user.
3) We asked 25 users participating in the first dataset to
write the two created strings in multiple sessions. For each of
the string, besides the 5 times at registration, the user wrote
it 5 times as one session, two or three sessions a week on
different days, for a period of 4 weeks (10 sessions in total).
4) Among the users who participate in the data collection
of both devices in the first dataset, 28 of them filed a
questionnaire on the usability of our prototype system (detailed
in section VII)
The datasets and data acquisition method are based on our
previous works [27], [28]. However, our datasets are larger
with two types of devices. The participating users are from
the general public including both office workers and non-office
workers with an age range of 17 to 65.
At the beginning of the data collection, we briefly intro-
duced our system to the users and informed them that the
in-air-handwriting is for login purpose. The users are allowed
to practice to write in the air for a few times. Most of them can
understand the idea easily and get prepared within a minute.
During the data collection, the user can voluntarily abort the
writing and the incomplete data is discarded. Only one data
glove and one Leap Motion controller are used and the data
collection processes with the two devices are separate. All
users write with the right hand and wear the glove on that hand.
The Leap Motion controller is placed on a table or a side table.
Both devices are connected to a laptop as the client machine.
For the first dataset, there is no constraint on the content of
the string created by the user except distinctiveness. Also there
is no constraint on the writing convention. For example, the
user can write in various direction, stack every character on
the same place, write while standing or sitting, with elbow
supported or not supported. Most users write very fast and their
writing is illegible, like the way of signing a signature. Since
the strings in the first dataset are distinct, we use them either
as a passcode for authentication or an ID for identification.
B. Authentication Experiments and Results
For authentication, each individual string is considered as
the passcode of an account, and in total there are 210 and 218
accounts with the glove and camera device respectively. We
run the following procedures with the 64 window (H = 64),
16 local features for each individual classifier (T = 16), and
32 classifiers as an ensemblement (M = 32).
1) We follow the registration process to create all the
accounts, construct passcode template and train the classifier
for each account. For the five signals for registration, all of
them are used to construct the template and train the SVM
classifier. Thus, For each account there are five training signals
with “true-user” label, and 5×(210−1) or 5×(218−1) training
signals with “not-true-user” label (i.e., the training signals of
other accounts).
2) We use each s of the five testing signals of the same
account as an authentication request (i.e., the ground truth
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Fig. 8. ROC with the glove device (left) and the camera device (right).
“without spoof” means the plot of FAR against FRR, and the line of “spoof
only” refers plotting FARspoof against FRR
label of s is “true-user”). If a signal from the “true-user” class
is misclassified to “not-true-user” class, the result is a False
Reject (FR); otherwise it is a True Accept (TA).
3) We use each s of the five testing signals of an account
as an authentication request to all other accounts (i.e., the
ground truth label of s is “guessing”). If a signal from the
“guessing” class is misclassified to the “true-user” class, the
result is defined as a False Accept (FA), otherwise it is a True
Reject (TR).
4) We use each s of the five spoofing signals in the dataset
2 as an authentication request to the spoofing target account
(i.e., the ground truth label of s is “spoofing”). If a signal
from the “spoofing” class is misclassified to the “true-user”
class, the result is defined as a Successful Spoof (SS), which
is considered as a special case of FA.
The main evaluation metrics are False Reject Rate (FRR)
and False Accept Rate (FAR), which are the the portions of
false rejects and false accepts in all authentication requests
respectively, formally defined as follows:
FRR =
1
kn
n∑
i=1
#{FRi},
FAR =
1
kn(n− 1)
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
#{FAij},
FARspoof =
1
kmn
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
#{SSij},
where n is the total number of accounts, k is the number
of testing authentication requests for each account, m is the
number of impostors. #{FRi} is the number of FR of the
ith account, #{FAij} is the number of FA for ith account
using the signals of jth account as the authentication requests,
and #{SSij} is the number of successful spoof for the ith
account by the jth impostor. Equal Error Rate (EER) is
defined as the rate where FRR is equal to FAR. FAR10K and
FAR100K denoets the FRR when FAR is 10−4 and 10−5,
respectively. ZeroFAR denotes the FRR when FAR is zero.
We varying the decision threshold to change the amount of
TABLE I
EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF AUTHENTICATION
Metric EER EER(spoof)
FAR
10K
FAR
100K
Zero
FAR
Ours (glove) 0.1% 2.2% 0.4% 0.9% 1.0%
DTW (glove) 0.6% 3.9% 3.0% 9.2% 13.1%
Ours (camera) 0.5% 4.4% 1.9% 4.6% 5.6%
DTW (camera) 2.1% 7.7% 15.9% 28.5% 30.8%
FR and FA, and results are shown in the Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve in Fig. 8. The results are shown
in Table I, with comparison to plain DTW method on the
same dataset with the same signal preprocessing techniques
using the same template. These evaluation metrics are widely
used in traditional biometric authentication systems such as
fingerprint [29]. For comparison, we mainly use the EER since
it is a single number that captures the general performance,
and for practical usage, FAR10K is more important.
Compared with plain DTW algorithm which is used in
many related works, our method has a significant performance
improvement. We believe DTW is a good alignment algorithm
but not necessarily a good matching algorithm. Our method
treats different local distance with different importance and
considers different segments of signal individually, while
DTW uses a sum of element-wise distance that may propagate
locally miss matched sample pair to the final result even for
signals in the “true-user” class. Besides, DTW treats every
segment of the signal equally, while some segments can be
more distinctive for different strings, e.g., the second half is
more important for the signals generated by writing “PASS-
CODE” and “PASSWORD”. In general the data obtained by
the glove device has higher consistency because it does not
restrict the user to write in a certain area. Also the signal
quality is better with the glove device, while signals with
the camera device can contain missing samples or wrongly
estimated hand postures. Hence, our prototype with the glove
device has better performance.
C. Identification Experiments and Results
In the identification experiments, each individual string is
considered as the ID associated to an account. For the five
signals at registration, we augment them to 125 signals to train
the CNN. The activation function we use in the convolutional
layer and fully-connected layers is a rectified linear unit
(ReLU). The whole network is trained for 20 epochs with
Adam algorithm [30] with a learning rate of 0.001. We use
a combination of cross-entropy loss and the center loss [31]
as the optimization target. The experiment procedures are as
follows.
1) First, we follow the registration process to create all the
accounts, train the CNN, construct the template and train the
SVM ensemblement.
2) Next, we use each s of the five testing signals of each
account as an identification request and run the identification
process. If s is from account A and the predicted account
9
Fig. 9. Identification performance with the glove device (left) and the camera device (right). The annotation shows results with identity verification.
number is A, it is a correct identification; otherwise it is an
incorrect identification.
3) After that, we use each s of the five spoofing signals in
dataset 2 as an identification request. If s is a spoofing attack
targeting account A and the predicted account number is A, it
is a successful spoof; otherwise it is an unsuccessful spoof.
We also run these experiments without the identity verifi-
cation. In this case, if the s is a testing signal from account
A or a spoofing attack targeting account A, and if the top-k
candidate account numbers predicted by the CNN contains A,
it is a correct identification or a successful spoof respectively.
It is commonly believed that ID is not a secret and the
identity verification should not be too strict to hurt usability.
Thus, we choose the threshold of the identity verification
with a value that achieves the EER for spoofing only data.
We vary k from 1 to 7 and show the results in Fig. 9. In
general, increasing the number of candidates helps identifica-
tion accuracy, at a marginal cost of slightly increased spoof
success rate. However, if identity verification is skipped, spoof
success rate will have a significant increase, which renders
the system vulnerable or even useless. The main cause is that
the CNN learns features for distinguishing difference stroke
combinations instead of distinguishing fine differences in the
signal segments of the same stroke. Also in practice, there is no
spoofing data available at registration time to train the CNN.
Essentially, the CNN also serves as an index for all accounts
in the database, which locates the probable accounts given
a signal instead of search it exhaustively. With exhaustive
search, our prototype system can achieve 99.9% accuracy
with the glove device and 99.5% accuracy with the camera
device. However, it takes more than one second to exhaustive
search on a database containing about 200 accounts. The time
consumption is mainly caused by accessing the stored template
as well as aligning the signal, and it will grow linearly with the
number of accounts in the database. More details on running
time are shown in Appendix A.
D. Permanence Experiments and Results
We use the third dataset to study the long term performance
of our prototype system by running the authentication proce-
dure and the identification procedure for the five signals in
each session. The change of authentication acceptance rate
is shown in Fig. 10 (with the same setup as that in the
authentication experiments described above, and a decision
threshold at FAR = 10−4). The figure shows slight perfor-
mance degradation with time. We can update the template
at the end of the session to prevent such a degradation for
future sessions. The new template is updated as an affine
combination of the old template and the new signal, i.e.,
tˆi ← (1 − λ)tˆi + λsi, where λ is the update factor set to
0.1 in this experiment. Additionally, we can also both update
the template and retrain the SVM classifers with both the old
signals and new signals, which can further maintain or even
improve performance.
The change of identification accuracy is shown in Fig. 11
(with the same setup as that in the identification experiments
described above). The figure shows slight performance degra-
dation with time. Similarly, the accuracy can be improved
significantly if the CNN and the SVM classifiers are both
retrained with the new signals at the end of the session. We
believe that for some users merely 5 signals at registration
cannot fully capture the uncertainty of the writing behavior,
even with our data augmentation methods. In practice, typing
a password can always be employed as a fallback. On the
smartphone, if the user does not unlock it immediately with
fingerprint or face, the smartphone will ask the user to type a
password. If the password passes, it will update the fingerprint
or face template accordingly. Such a strategy can also be
utilized in our framework since showing a virtual keyboard
to type a password can always be an backup option, though it
is inconvenient.
E. Comparison to Existing Works
A comparison to existing works which also use in-air-
handwriting is shown in the Table II. The major characteristics
that differentiate our framework from them are as follows.
First we use a data driven method by designing features
and utilizing machine learning models, instead of crafting
algorithms calculating a matching distance for authentication.
Second, we avoid exhaustively searching and comparing the
whole account database for user identification. Third, we
evaluate performance of our framework under active spoofing
attacks and with a time span of near a month, which is usually
omitted by existing works. Fourth, our system has a significant
performance improvement on a dataset with reasonable size.
A more complete list and comparison of related work in this
area is provided in Appendix C.
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Fig. 10. Authentication permanence performance with the glove device (left) and the camera device (right). Annotation shows results with update and retrain.
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Fig. 11. Identification permanence performance with the glove device (left) and the camera device (right). Annotation shows results with update.
F. Comparison to Password and Other Biometrics
In Table III we present a comparison of FMCode with
password and biometrics based system. The results shown here
are obtained from different publications with various datasets,
which merely show limited information as an intuition about
their performance, instead of the performance with serious and
strongly supervised evaluation. First we show the classification
accuracy in terms of EER. Here FMCode is comparable to fin-
gerprint (on FVC2004 [29] among all the datasets), face, iris,
and signature. Comparing to biometrics, a considerable portion
of discrimination capability comes from the large content
space of the in-air-handwriting. Next we show the equivalent
key space in number of bits. For password used in device
unlock, the commonly used 4-digit password (default setting
on most smartphone) are considered, and for biometrics, the
equivalent key space is defined by log2(1/FAR) [32]. For
FMCode we calculate key space with the corresponding FAR
by setting the decision threshold at a place where the true
user has 95% successful login rate (i.e., 5% FRR). The results
show that FMCode is also comparable to password based login
and authentication system. Due to the limited amount of data,
we cannot achieve an FAR resolution lower than 5 × 10−6,
i.e., more than 17.6 bit key space. For the glove device, at
the 5% FRR decision threshold, the FAR is already 0 but we
can only conclude that the equivalent key space is larger than
17.6 bits. In practice, recommended password key space is
between 28 to 128 bits [33] while web users typically choose
passwords with 20 to 90 bits key space and on average it is 40
to 41 bits [34]. However such large key space is underutilized
because it is well known that people are not good at creating
and memorizing strong password, and the actually entropy is
much less than the whole key space [35]. Moreover, since
password must contain letters that can be typed on keyboard,
efficient password guessing strategies such as dictionary attack
further weaken the calculated password quality in number of
bits. A more detailed analysis on the comparison of usability,
deployability, and security with password and biometrics is
provided in Appendix B.
VII. USER EVALUATION
We investigated the usability of our framework by taking
questionnaire from 30 users with the experience of both the
glove device and the camera device. First, the users evaluate
various aspects of our in-air-handwriting based login frame-
work with a score from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree). The results are shown in Fig. 12.
Second, we ask the user to compare our framework with the
password based systems and biometrics including fingerprint
and face, on the easiness of usage, login speed and security.
The user has three options: (a) our framework is better, (b) they
are the same or difficult to decide which one is better or worse,
(c) our framework is worse. The results are shown in Fig. 13.
We can see that the user has a mixed attitude on the usability
compared to traditional password, but clearly FMCode can
not compete biometrics like fingerprint and face in usability.
However, the majority of the users feel that FMCode is more
secure than traditional password, and more than half of them
feel it is more secure than fingerprint and face.
Third, we ask the following questions:
1) Compared to password, our framework fuses handwriting
convention. Is this characteristic important?
2) Compared to biometrics, our framework allows change
and revoke the in-air-handwriting passcode, which is unlinked
to personal identity. Is this characteristic important?
Among the surveyed users, 89% and 82% of them answer
“important” for the first and second characteristics respec-
tively. Combined with the previous results, we can conclude
that FMCode does not intend to replace existing password-
based solution or biometrics. Instead, due to its unique char-
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TABLE II
COMPARISON TO EXISTING WORKS.
Ref. datasetsize
EER
(w/o spoof)
EER
(w/ spoof)
Identification
Accuracy Device Algorithm
FMCode (glove) 105 (210) 0.1% 2.2% 96.7% (99.9%) data glove SVM / CNN
FMCode (camera) 109 (218) 0.5% 4.4% 94.3% (99.5%) Leap Motion SVM / CNN
Liu et al.[6] 20 ∼ 25 ∼ 3% ∼10% 88 ∼ 98.4% Wii remote DTW
Bailador et al.[5] 96 1.8% ∼ 2.1% ∼ 5% N/A smartphone DTW, Bayes, HMM
Bashir et al.[36] 40 ∼1.8% N/A 98.5% custom digital pen DTW
Chan et al.[9] 16 0.8% N/A 98% Leap Motion random forest
Tian et al.[11] 18 ∼2% N/A N/A Kinect DTW
TABLE III
COMPARISON TO PASSWORD AND BIOMETRICS.
metric FMCode(glove)
FMCode
(camera)
Password
(online login)
Password
(device unlock) Fingerprint Face Iris Signature
EER (w/o spoof) 0.1% 0.5% N/A N/A 0.28%∼2% [29] 2.6%∼8.6% [37] 0.11% [32] 1%∼3% [38]
Key Space (bits) >17.6 16 20∼90 [34] 13.3 13.3 [32] N/A 19.9 [32] N/A
acteristics that passwords and biometrics lack, FMCode is suit-
able in scenarios where such characteristics matter and where
passwords and biometrics are not applicable, for example,
login over gesture interface on VR headset or in operating
theater.
At last, we ask the user which type of device is preferred
between a wearable device and a contactless device for hand
motion tracking. 21% of the users choose the wearable device
and the other 79% choose the contactless device.
VIII. DISCUSSION
A. Other Attacks
There are other potential attacks on our authentication
system if some of our security assumptions do not hold. For
example, the attacker may be able to access the server’s storage
to steal the templates. Due to the inherent fuzziness in the
authentication step, traditional hash is not able to protect the
templates like the hashed password. One possible solution that
we are working on is to adapt the deep CNN to generate a
fuzzy hash and further a set of keys for each account using
the signals at registration. The templates can be encrypted by
each of the key to form a pool. At login time, the same neural
network is applied on the signal in the login request to obtain
a fuzzy hash and a key. It is highly possible that this key
can decrypt an encrypted templates in the pool, if the signal
is generated by the legitimate user performing the correct
FMCode. After the template decryption, the authentication
procedure can continue. If the templates can be successfully
decrypted by the generated key from the signal in the login
request, we can not conclude that the user is authenticated. As
we have shown in the identification results, the ID is easier
to spoof without a verification step, thus an impostor with the
knowledge of the ID and the passcode may also be able to
derive an acceptable key. However, the attacker that steals the
templates does not have such knowledge.
Another possible threat is man-in-the-middle attacks, where
the attacker intercepts and records the messages between the
server and the client. We believe this is not critical because
machine-to-machine authentication and message encryption
can be used first to allow the client and the server to com-
municate securely. Existing technologies such as SSL/TLS
and public key infrastructure (PKI) over the Internet can be
leveraged to build a secure communication channel before user
login, similar to the case of password-based login on most
websites over the Internet nowadays.
On the user side, record and replay attacks must also be
handled. The authentication request require to present a multi-
dimensional signal about the physical states of the hand during
the writing. In a preliminary experiment, we found that it is
difficult to synthesis such a signal from a video recorded by
monolens camera or depth camera placed 1 meter away from
the user. The main reason is the drastic spatial resolution drop
with distance, which cause limited hand skeleton estimation
accuracy. A seconary reason is the posture uncertainty of the
user and the motion blur due to insufficient frame rate of the
camera. If the camera is close to the user, the user might get
alerted, just like if someone within a proximity is watching
a user typing his or her password, the user will be alerted
and stop typing. More details about this type of attack will be
presented in future work.
IX. RELATED WORKS
Traditional user authentication methods can be based on
physiological traits (e.g., biometrics, like fingerprint and iris),
knowledge (e.g., password), and possession (e.g., a card or
a token). Unfortunately, none of them are perfect because
physiological traits can be copied (e.g. iris spoofing by taking
eye pictures), knowledge can be forgotten (e.g. forgotten
password), and possession can be lost or faked (e.g. stolen
or copied card). Currently, password and biometrics are the
most widely adopted authentication approaches, but they both
have shortcomings. On the password side, remembering more
and more passwords is a problem for the user, because a
memorable password is usually not strong, while a strong
12
password is difficult to remember [34]. Most users just reuse
the same password for many sites [39], and they rarely update
it or only update it in certain predictable patterns [40]. As
a result, password based system works far from optimal and
there are numerous works which have made attempts to replace
password [32], [41]. On the biometrics side, although identity
verification using fingerprint [29] and iris [42] is convenient,
inexpensive and more secure than password in some cases,
biometrics are inherently not secret, and they are irrevocable
after leakage. Moreover, biometric authentication is directly
linked to a person and hence sensitive to privacy issues.
FMCode fuses a secret with the handwriting behavior, which
has the advantages of both password and biometrics. Besides,
FMCode is able to defend spoofing attack, while such attacks
are surprisingly effective for biometrics [43].
Early gesture and body motion based authentication meth-
ods use the accelerometer to track simple motions like shaking
[44], [45], [46], walking [47], [48], or other predefined gesture
patterns [49], which proves the feasibility of such methods.
In-air-handwriting captured by a smartphone[50], [7], [5],
handhold remote control devices [6] or a smartwatch [51]
has better potentials because the complex motions contain
more information unique to each user. However, the user
behavior of writing with such devices different from pen is
unnatural and inconsistent. In-air-handwriting with fingertip is
also investigated with camera based gesture interface such as
Kinect [11], [52], [53] and Leap Motion [10], [54], [9], [55].
The major drawback of such methods is strong constraints on
the size, speed, and orientation of a user’s movement, because
these cameras are set up at a fixed place. These constraints
have a negative influence on both usability and authentication
performance, as can be shown by the performance difference
of our framework with the two different types of devices.
Wearable monolens cameras such as Google Glass [8] would
have certain advantages. However the vision understanding
and pose estimation of hands in changing environment is
difficult. For gesture based authentication, the critical technical
challenge is developing good features and classifiers that can
tolerate variations and long term behavior changes of the
captured motions of the same user as well as distinguishing
different users with high accuracy. For gesture based identi-
fication, the critical technical challenge is designing efficient
way to index each account by the gesture signal or features
for fast search.
Handwriting and signature has been studied extensively
in the past, but FMCode is fundamentally different from
handwriting [56], [57] or hand gesture recognition [58], [59],
[60], i.e., the former identifies and verifies the writer while
the latter recognizes the content of writing or meaning of the
gesture regardless of the writer. Since a recognition system
of handwriting or hand gesture tries to group similar motion
patterns to the same class, if they are used as login systems, the
recognized content is essentially another form of a password,
which is vulnerable when the content of the writing is leaked.
Besides, our framework is different from online signature
verification [38]. We allow the user to draw arbitrary patterns
Fig. 12. User evaluation scores.
Fig. 13. User evaluation with comparison.
instead of signatures (i.e., names), and we capture 3D motions
of fingertip instead of movement of a pen or digital pen
with sensors [36], [61] on a 2D surface. Our method targets
the application scenarios with gesture interface but lacking
tradition input interfaces like keyboard or mouse. For the same
reason, we omit comparison to existing 2D free gesture based
system on touchscreen [12], [13], [14].
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present FMCode, a user authentication
and identification framework for applications using gesture
input interface. FMCode does not completely replace password
or biometrics in all use cases, but it can be an alternative
way for user login over gesture interface where password and
passive biometrics are inconvenient or not applicable. Our
prototype system and experimental results show great potential
of this method. However, FMCode also has limitations under
certain security assumptions, which require further investiga-
tion, including methods of direct key generation from in-air-
handwriting signals and performance under record and replay
attack.
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APPENDIX
A. Cost of Computing and Storage
We implemented our prototype system in Python with
sklearn library and TensorFlow [62]. Preprocessing a single
signal cost about 25 ms for the glove device (excluding the
state estimation step since it is running on the device instead
of the client machine) and 100 ms for the camera device,
where filtering is the bottleneck. In authentication, generate
template cost 2.1 ms and training the SVM cost 30 ms for
each account; classification of each signal cost less than 1
ms, which is negligible compared to the time for writing the
string. The time consumption measured here does not contain
loading the data and model from disk to the main memory,
because the disk speed varies significantly due to the page
cache in the main memory and our dataset is small enough
to be fully fit in the cache, which is quite different when
used in real world scenarios. This measurement is conducted
with a single threaded program on a workstation with Intel
Xeon E3-1230 CPU (quad-core 3.2GHz, 8M cache) and 32 GB
main memory. For identification, training the deep CNN for
20 epochs requires around 7 minutes using only CPU, while
with a powerful GPU (Nvida GTX 1080 Ti in our case) this
can drastically decrease to around 30 seconds; classification
using the CNN costs less than 1 ms with only CPU. The space
cost for template storage and the amount of data needed to be
transferred between the server and the client is proportional to
the signal length. If each sensor axis of a sample is represented
in single precision floating point number (four bytes), the
average space cost of a signal is 8.6 KB with our datasets
for both devices (they both output data with 9 sensor axis). If
all parameters are represented in single precision floating point
number, storing the SVM classifiers costs 79 KB per account
on average, and storing the CNN itself requires around 4 MB
because of the 1 million weights and biases parameters.
B. Comparison to Password and Biometrics in Usability,
Deployability, Security
We evaluated the usability, deployability and security of
FMCode using the criteria provided by [41], and the result
is shown in Table IV. We added two aspects in deployability,
“configurable” and “developer friendly” mentioned in [63].
Each usability, deployability and security item is evaluated
by whether our FMCode method possess the characteristics,
and a plus / minus sign means that our method is better /
worse than password. We explain a few items here but the
readers are recommended to refer to [41] and [63] for the
definition of these characteristics. In general, compared with
password and biometrics, FMCode achieves nearly all their
usability and deployability characteristics, and it contains the
security advantages from both password and biometrics.
On the usability side, nothing to carry means the user
does not to present a physical item such as a card. Though
our prototype system uses a glove, the glove is treated as
a general gesture input device, just like password does not
require the user to bring a keyboard everywhere. Arguably,
FMCode has less memory burden because in section 6 we
shows the discrimination capability comes from 3 layers of
information instead of just the combination of characters in
password, so memorable FMCode is not necessarily weak
any more. However, there might be potentially more frequent
rejection of legitimate user login than password because the
internal fluctuation in the stability of finger motion.
On the deployability side, since the server only needs
to store the template as a secret, FMCode is similar as
those behavior biometrics without using special devices (e.g.,
keyboard or mouse dynamics), thus it can be compatible with
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TABLE IV
USABILITY, DEPLOYABILITY, AND SECURITY EVALUATION OF FMCODE.
Usability FMCode Deployability FMCode Security FMCode
Memory effortless Maybe (+) Accessible Yes Resilient to physical observation Yes (+)
Scalable for users Maybe (+) Scalable Yes Resilient to targeted impersonation Maybe (+)
Nothing to carry Yes Server compatible Maybe (-) Resilient to throttled guessing Maybe
Physically effortless No Browser compatible Maybe (-) Resilient to unthrottled guessing No
Easy to learn Yes Mature No (-) Resilient to theft Yes (+)
Efficient to use Yes Non-proprietary Yes No trusted third party required Yes
Infrequent errors Maybe (-) Configurable[63] Yes Requiring explicit consent Yes
Easy to recovery Yes Developer friendly[63] Yes Unlinkable Yes
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ALGORITHMS OF RELATED WORKS.
Related Works # ofsubjects Device
Experiment
Timespan EER
Claimed
Accuracy
Motion
Gesture Algorithm
Patel et al.[44] NA Cellphone w/accelerometer NA NA NA shake
static
threshold
Okumura et al.[45] 12 ∼ 22 Cellphone w/accelerometer 6 weeks 4% NA shake DTW
Mayrhofer et al.[46] 51 Custom devicew/ accelerometer NA
∼2%,
∼10% NA shake
frequency
coherence
Farella et al.[49] 5 ∼ 10 PDA w/accelerometer NA NA
63%
∼ 97%
4 specified
gestures
PCA / LLE
+ kNN
Lester et al.[48] 6 Custom devicew/ accelerometer NA NA 100% walk
frequency
coherence
Gafurov et al.[47] 30 Custom devicew/ accelerometer NA 10% NA walk
frequency
similarity
Liu et al.[6] 20 ∼ 25 Nintendo Wiiremote 1 ∼ 4 weeks
∼3%,
>10%
88%
∼ 99% free writing DTW
Zaharis et al.[7] 4 Nintendo Wiiremote 3 weeks NA 98.20% free writing
statistical
feature matching
Casanova et al.[5] 96 Smartphone 20 days ∼2.5% NA free writing DTW, Bayes,HMM
Lee et al.[64] 15 Smartphone NA NA 88.40% tap, flip, etc. decision tree
Bashir et al.[36] 10 ∼ 40 Custom pen NA ∼1.8% 98.50% alphabetic orfree writing RDTW
Renuka et al.[61] 12 Custom pen NA NA ∼ 95% alphabetic orfree writing NA
Aslan, et al.[54] 13 Leap Motion NA ∼10% NA 2 specifiedgestures DTW
Nigam et al.[10] 150 Leap Motion NA NA 81% free writing statistical featureclassification
Chan et al.[9] 16 Leap Motion NA 0.80% >99% free writing random forest
Piekarczyk et al.[55] 4 ∼ 5 Leap Motion NA NA 88%∼ 100%
4 specified
gestures
DCT + DTW
+ kNN / LSH
Tian et al.[11] 18 Kinect 5 months ∼2% NA free writing DTW
Sajid et al.[8] 10 Google Glass NA NA 97.50% free writing PCA + GMMClustering + DTW
Wu et al.[52] 20 Kinect NA 1.89% NA 8 gestures DTW
Hayashi et al.[53] 36 Kinect 2 weeks 0.5%∼ 1.6% NA hand waving SVM
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most server with small software modification. FMCode can be
supported by browsers on devices with gesture input interface,
where the FMCode input of a user can be treated as a very
long password and sent to the server over the Internet, similar
as the case of logining in a website using password.
On the security side, FMCode can withstand spoof under
semantic or visual disclosure and targeted impersonation to a
certain extent, which is more like biometrics than password.
But unlike passive biometrics, FMCode is changable and more
difficult to steal. For example, an attacker can collect a user’s
fingerprint from a cup after the user has touched it, but FM-
Code can only be recorded when the user performs it. FMCode
suffers from server storage leakage and internal observer if the
template is not properly protected, and such proper template
protection might be difficult because of fussiness in alignment
and matching. Also it shares all other security deficiencies
of password and biometrics under attacks such as brute-force
guessing/collision, dictionary guessing, phishing and cross-site
leakage.
Compared with traditional password, FMCode uses hand-
writing, which makes it a behavior biometrics, and this pro-
vides certain protection under semantic or visual disclosure
of the passcode. On the other side, compared with unchange-
able biometrics like fingerprint, FMCode keeps most of the
advantages of a password such as revocability and privacy
preserving. This also allows one user to have more than
one FMCode, different from traditional behavior biometrics
like gait or voice in active speaker recognition. The most
similar authentication techniques would be online signature
verification (technically speaking, handwriting verification), or
graphical password with stroke dynamics, but most of they
assume a 2D pressure sensitive touchscreen instead of writing
in the air.
C. Comparison of Related Works
A comparison of related works is shown in Table V.
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